INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies when a claim is originally cognizable in the courts but involves issues that fall within the special competence of an administrative agency. Under the doctrine, a court can stay litigation and refer such issues to the agency for its decision.' Primary jurisdiction is a cousin of better known abstention doctrines that permit (and sometimes require) federal courts to abstain from addressing issues cognizable by state courts or state agencies. 2 The essential difference between primary jurisdiction and these other forms of abstention is that primary jurisdiction furthers comity between federal courts and federal agencies rather than federal courts and state institutions.
As the Supreme Court has explained, "[n]o fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction." 3 When a federal district court decides if an agency has primary jurisdiction over an issue, it must ask "whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation."' One thing is certain: every grant of primary jurisdiction requires district courts to first interpret enabling statutes and then exercise judicial discretion. Because the propriety of primary jurisdiction includes legal and discretionary considerations, circuit courts face the difficult task of deciding whether to review primary jurisdiction decisions de novo or for abuse of discretion. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law and therefore reviewed de novo. Decisions that turn on the discretion of a trial court are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Circuits currently disagree on how to review primary jurisdiction rulings. Some circuits review de novo, while others review for abuse of discretion.! Both standards lack sufficient precision. Similar to other abstention doctrines, the proper approach is to view primary jurisdiction as a two-step inquiry and review it in a two-tiered fashion. Courts of appeals should review the legal predicate necessary to grant primary jurisdiction de novo and the discretionary component for abuse of discretion.
This Comment explores why circuit courts are split on the standard of review and proposes to resolve the split by offering an alternative to either exclusively de novo review or review for abuse of discretion. Part I provides background on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and compares it to other doctrines of federal court abstention. Part II analyzes the two competing standards of review and attempts to explain the development of the current split. Part III urges appellate courts to abandon the choice between the de novo and abuse of discretion standards, and suggests reviewing in a two-step manner that parallels the two-step inquiry of district courts.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
This Part examines the evolution of primary jurisdiction and its role in distributing decisionmaking power between courts and agencies. Primary jurisdiction evolved out of the Supreme Court's recognition that federal agencies are sometimes superior decisionmaking bodies because of their expertise and ability to preserve uniformity within a regulatory scheme. In this way, it furthers the same institutional values as the Chevron doctrine. Under Chevron US.A. Inc v NRDC, 7 deference to agency interpretations of statutes is after-thefact. Primary jurisdiction, in contrast, is a form of abstention. 8 Like other abstention doctrines, it operates by providing before-the-fact deference notwithstanding judicial jurisdiction over a matter. Also like other abstention doctrines, primary jurisdiction requires courts to engage in a two-step analysis.
ICC to administer the statute with uniformity. Therefore, the matter should have been referred to the ICC. '8 The Court emphasized agency expertise as a reason for abstention forty-five years later in Far East Conference v United States." 9 The United States sued the Far East Conference under the Sherman Act to enjoin them from imposing a dual-rate system for steam shipping. The Far East Conference was a voluntary association of steamship companies who agreed to charge each other a discounted shipping rate as long as they never used nonmembers' ships.7O Companies "who did not bind themselves by such exclusive patronage contract paid a fixed higher rate." 2 The Supreme Court held that the Federal Maritime Board would have to address the government's claim that the Conference's policy of charging its members lower rates than nonmembers violated the antitrust laws." The Court's rationale was that a decision would implicate considerations "generally unfamiliar to a judicial tribunal, but well understood by an administrative body especially trained and experienced in the intricate and technical facts." ' ' The Court noted the complexity of the international shipping industry in requiring the Maritime Board to address the government's claims, but maintained that a court could ultimately resolve the dispute."
Even though regulatory uniformity was not a concern, the Court established that primary jurisdiction can also be appropriate when the expertise of an agency will minimize the risk of judicial error.
United States v Western Pacific Railroad Con and the modern
formulation of primary jurisdiction.
In the pivotal case of Western Pacific Railroad, the Supreme Court synthesized the two considerations driving primary jurisdiction and set out its modern framework. Three railroads sued the United States to 18 Id at 440-41. In a later case, the Court highlighted the importance of the statutory interpretation element of a primary jurisdiction determination more explicitly than it had in Texas and Pacific Railway. See General American Tank Car Corp v El Dorado Terminal Co, 308 US 422, 433 (1940) ("When it appeared ... that an administrative problem, committed to the [ICC] , was involved, the court should have stayed its hand pending the [ICC's] determination of the lawfulness and reasonableness of the practices under the terms of the Act.").
19 342 US 570 (1952) . 20 Id at 572. 21 See id at 572. 22 Id at 573. 23 Id at-573-74, quoting United States Navigation Co v Cunard Steamship Co, 284 US 474, 485 (1932) . 24 See Far East Conference, 342 US at 573-74 (concluding that the Federal Maritime Board "should not be passed over ... even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined").
25 352 US 59 (1956) .
recover the difference between tariff rates actually paid by the United
States and those that the railroads alleged were due." The government argued that the litigation should be stayed to allow the ICC to first address whether the rates requested by the railroads were unreasonable. 27 The Court of Claims declined to do so and entered summary judgment in favor of the railroads. " The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims's refusal to suspend the action. 29 The Court held that the issues should be referred to the ICC, and, in so doing, it outlined the modern framework of primary jurisdiction:
Primary jurisdiction ... applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views."' The Supreme Court recognized that "[n]o fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction." 3 There are, however, two elements involved in every trial court's grant of primary jurisdiction. First, a court must determine if a statute grants an administrative agency authority over the issues that are potentially the subject of primary jurisdiction.
2 This first step is a question of statutory interpretation. Second, if the issue is one that the agency has authority to ad-
26
Id at 60.
27
Id at 61-62. 28 Id at 62.
29
Id at 63.
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Id at 63-64 (quotation marks omitted). This framework reflects a shift from the view in Texas and Pacific Railway and Far East Conference that the doctrine required exclusive jurisdiction to be vested in an agency. The original and strongest version of primary jurisdiction is more aptly viewed as "exclusive jurisdiction" or part of the "exhaustion" of remedies doctrine. See Western Pacific Railroad, 352 US at 63 ("'Exhaustion' applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course."). Modern primary jurisdiction is applied in a "weaker sense." In re StarNet, Inc, 355 F3d 634, 639 (7th Cir 2004) ("This is not to say that the agency has exclusive jurisdiction, the original and strongest meaning of 'primary jurisdiction. ' We use the phrase in its weaker sense, as a doctrine that allows a court to refer an issue to an agency that knows more about the issue.") (citation omitted). See also Reiter v Cooper, 507 US 258, 268 (1993) (stating that the conflation of exhaustion and primary jurisdiction "reflects a mistaken understanding of primary jurisdiction, which is a doctrine specifically applicable to claims properly cognizable in court that contain some issue within the special competence of an administrative agency").
31 Western Pacific Railroad, 352 US at 64.
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Id (explaining that primary jurisdiction "comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body"). dress, then a court must decide "whether the purposes [the doctrine] serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation." ' This second step is a matter of discretion.
Under Western Pacific Railroad, courts consider two factors when deciding whether to exercise their discretion at the second step of the analysis. The first is whether giving an agency the initial opportunity to decide an issue will foster "the desirable uniformity which would obtain if initially a specialized agency passed on certain ... questions." ' The second is whether "the expert and specialized knowledge of the [agency]" will assist in the proper resolution of an issue. 35 In evaluating the second question, courts often consider three factors. First, they examine whether the issues involve matters that extend "beyond the conventional experiences of judges."'" For example, in National Communications Association, Inc v AT&T,"' the Second Circuit concluded that the question of whether a company qualified for a particular tariff, which turned on whether it had paid bills on time, was a simple factual question that did not "present any issues involving intricate interpretations or applications of tariffs that might need the FCC's technical or policy expertise." 8 The court noted that "[s]tatutory reasonableness of a tariff should, of course, be reviewed by an agency because it is an abstract quality represented by an area rather than a pinpoint." 9 Second, courts consider "whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings." This factor often depends on a court's view of whether there are issues beyond the conventional knowledge of judges. Judges' determinations of issues within their conventional knowledge are less likely to be deemed incorrect by an expert agency. In National Communications Association, the Second Circuit determined there was no risk of inconsistent rulings because the district court would not be required to interpret any tariff provisions of the relevant statute nor address the reasonableness of any tariff provisions." Because courts do not develop narrow expertise, judicial inter-
33
Id. 34 pretation of tariff provisions would likely differ from that of an agency with expert knowledge in the relevant industry. Finally, courts look to "whether a prior application to the agency has been made." 2 They do this because reference to an agency can substantially delay litigation that may need quick resolution. 43 The National Communications Association court agreed with the petitioner's conclusion that "the district court failed to recognize the need to resolve this dispute as quickly and fairly as possible."" The Second Circuit concluded that "a potential delay of even two years more than outweighs any benefit that might be achieved by having the FCC resolve this relatively simple factual dispute."" 5 An important procedural aspect of primary jurisdiction is that when a court applies the doctrine, the "[rieferral ... to the administrative agency does not deprive the court of jurisdiction." 6 Instead, the court maintains jurisdiction and proceedings are usually stayed. 7 Primary jurisdiction is not, therefore, jurisdictional in a strict sense. It merely relates to whether a court will exercise its jurisdiction." If pri-
42
Id at 222. Courts often ask a fourth question-"whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency's discretion"-even though it merely adds a semantic variant to the statutory interpretation element of a primary jurisdiction determination. Id 47 If the court decides "the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged," it is permissible for a court "to dismiss the case without prejudice." Id at 268-69.
48
Sometimes the enabling statute will provide a mechanism whereby a court can demand or request an agency's view. More often, the "referral" is "left to the adversary system" -that is, the court stays proceedings to allow one of the parties to file with the agency. Id at 268 n 3. It has been pointed out that "presently [primary jurisdiction] is used to refer to both issues that must be initially decided by the administrative agency and issues that may be initially decided by the administrative agency." Childress and Davis, Federal Standards of Review at 14.08 (cited in note 5). But this view ignores the discrete adjudicative steps discussed above. Issues that must be decided by an administrative agency do not implicate the judicial discretion exercised in step two. If the court must abstain after determining Congress granted an agency sole authority to address the issues as an initial matter, it is properly considered exhaustion. Reiter, 507 US at 268-69 (contrasting exhaustion with the "referral" process of primary jurisdiction). One commentator has noted that primary jurisdiction "shares with the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted the purpose of obtaining the views of an agency on matters within its competence." Currie, Federal Courts 503 n 3 (cited in note 8). But, unlike exhaustion, agency action is not required before a federal court can address the issues subject to primary jurisdiction. Id As the foregoing background suggests, primary jurisdiction "is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies."' Application of primary jurisdiction ''represents a determination that administrative agencies are better equipped than the courts to handle particular questions, and that referral of appropriate questions to an agency ensures desirable uniformity of results." 5 Primary jurisdiction is based on the same rationale as the Chevron doctrine. In Chevron, the Supreme Court addressed the proper framework for deference to administrative agencies on issues of statutory interpretation. 2 First, a court must consider whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 53 If the statute is clear, "that is the end of the matter" because the agency, like the court, "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. ' In some ways, the Chevron doctrine mirrors primary jurisdiction. Both first steps are a pure question of legal interpretation in which judges apply the full panoply of interpretive tools. Similarly, both second steps provide an opportunity for courts to defer to agencies. Chevron creates after-the-fact deference by upholding any agency interpretation that is "permissible." Primary jurisdiction creates a before-the-fact opportunity for an agency to decide certain issues. Those decisions are then reviewed with varying degrees of deference. Operationally, the parallel is limited. Chevron is after-the-fact review of agency interpretations, and both steps relate to statutory interpretation. 7 In the broader administrative context, however, the values underlying Chevron illustrate why primary jurisdiction is also important.
Chevron deference has been questioned by academics on practical and constitutional grounds, yet it remains vital. 9 There are five common justifications for Chevron.6 The first is political responsiveness and accountability. Administration of a regulatory regime inevitably involves "the essentially legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of various private interests affected by agency policy. 61 Deference to agencies allows "the citizenry, through the mechanism of electing a President, to effect a change in governmental policies without incurring the high transaction costs of securing enactment of specific legislation. 62 A second justification is comparative competence. Agencies are experts on the subject matter of statutes they administer. Agencies hire technical experts, are repeat players on their policy subject matter, and maintain relations with relevant stakeholders.u Article III courts are generalists. Because they lack the institutional expertise of agencies they are ill-equipped to understand certain issues and unable to properly balance relevant considerations.4
A third justification for.Chevron is efficiency. The Chevron doctrine gives agencies more interpretive authority. This increased authority channels high-quality, aggressive argumentation to agency proceedings. 65 Moreover, agencies are encouraged to take responsibility for resolving issues and improving their procedures.i Therefore, litigants will be less inclined to seek review of agency determinations in light of the increased investment up front (by the agency and the par-61 ties) and decreased expectations of a favorable outcome on review. Even though judges stay proceedings under primary jurisdiction, there are potential efficiency gains. Parties are encouraged to invest more in resolving disputes via agencies beforehand. Agencies, in turn, will have the same incentive to take responsibility and improve their ability to address parties' issues.
A fourth justification is national uniformity. The centralization of agency decisionmaking relative to federal courts allows uniform policymaking.6 ' Chevron deference and primary jurisdiction are methods
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Byse, 2 Admin L J at 257 (cited in note 58). Bell Telephone Co, 137 F3d 605, 609 (8th Cir 1998) ("The FCC has far more expertise than the courts on matters such as circuit designs, signal transmissions, noise attenuation, and echo return loss. Thus, the need to draw upon the FCC's expertise and experience is present here.").
65
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Yale J Reg 283,311 (1986) (asserting that under Chevron, "litigants will have an increased incentive to make their best arguments, clearly and aggressively, before the agency rather than waiting for the main event at the courthouse").
66 Id. 67 Byse, 2 Admin L J at 258 (cited in note 58). 68 Consider, for example, National Communications Association, 46 F3d at 222 (noting that agency proceedings already underway favor a grant of primary jurisdiction at step two).
69
See Byse, 2 Admin L J at 259 (cited in note 58) ("The more independent the scope of review [of administrative agencies,] the greater likelihood of differing judicial responses in these various courts.").
of "allocating functions between agencies and courts so as to reduce the chance that the lower courts will introduce undesirable geographical diversity into national law, thus reducing the number of occasions when the court must intervene." 7 Finally, a common justification for Chevron deference, which also highlights the institutional role of primary jurisdiction, is agency flexibility. Agencies can react to technological or political changes more easily than can courts. 71 Courts are less flexible. Their influence over regulatory regimes is exercised almost exclusively through deciding cases. In addition, courts' flexibility is limited by the binding presence of precedent. They are not only slow, but often unwilling to respond to "scientific, industrial, or other developments." 7
Chevron and primary jurisdiction serve the same goals by shifting decisionmaking power. The authority of courts and agencies "interact[s] over a broad range of situations." 73 In these situations, primary jurisdiction harmonizes the comparative advantages of agency decisionmaking with judicial jurisdiction by providing a framework for determining if an agency's view will aid in resolving the overall dispute. Primary jurisdiction is critical because many disputes in which agency involvement would further proper resolution "cannot be resolved by the single abstraction of administrative expertness."" A complete understanding of primary jurisdiction also requires comparing it to other forms of abstention. The theme that ties Chevron deference and primary jurisdiction together -because a court can do something does not mean it ought to -makes both similar to established abstention doctrines that seek to promote comity between 71 See Byse, 2 Admin L J at 259 (cited in note 58) (asserting that while it is unlikely that a court "will later change its interpretive mind," an agency is more likely to adapt to changing circumstances).
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Id.
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Jaffe, 77 Harv L Rev at 1038 (cited in note 1) (discussing various contexts in which causes of action and remedies involve issues within the jurisdiction of courts and agencies).
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Id at 1041. See also, for example, Williams Pipe Line, 76 F3d at 1496 ("Thus, while the court is ultimately the appropriate body to declare a tariff practice void as against public policy, it should nonetheless refer the initial determination to the regulatory agency where it may benefit from the agency's expertise and insight, and to ensure uniformity."). ask whether the requirements for abstention exist. "2 A judge who has determined that the legal predicate for abstention exists must then determine whether, "as a matter of sound equitable discretion," the court should abstain. " Other forms of abstention share this two-step quality. Colorado River abstention allows a federal court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction and defer to a state court's concurrent jurisdiction when a parallel state action is pending.w This form of abstention is "one resting ... on considerations of ... conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation."" The first question for a district court under Colorado River is whether "exceptional circumstances" sufficient for abstention exist-a legal question.8 If the district court determines that the conditions for allowing abstention exist, the district court must exercise its discretion to determine whether abstention is appropriate in the particular case."
82 Circuit courts vary how they frame this determination. See, for example, US. West Communications, 284 F3d at 1133 (requiring the district court to determine that "the state has chosen to concentrate suits challenging the actions of the agency involved," that "federal issues could not be separated easily from complex state law issues with respect to which state courts might have special competence," and that "federal review might disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy"); Bethphage Lutheran Service, Inc v Weicker, 965 F2d 1239, 1243-45 (2d Cir 1992) (considering "the degree of specificity of the state regulatory scheme, the necessity of discretionary interpretation of state statutes, [ ] whether the subject matter of the litigation is traditionally one of state concern," and whether the state has created a centralized system of review allowing the agency to acquire specialized knowledge). The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication. If the necessary legal conditions for Thibodaux abstention exist, abstention is requisite. 9 Younger abstention differs from primary jurisdiction in the same way as Thibodaux abstention.' Younger abstention precludes federal courts from enjoining pending state court proceedings (that is, requires abstention), especially if important state issues are at stake. 9 The criteria for determining whether abstention is proper are varied and difficult to assess." Whether Younger abstention is appropriate, however, involves a single "essentially legal determination of whether the requirements for abstention have been met. 97 Each abstention doctrine has a different flavor. Yet they "uniformly reflect a desire to allow state courts to decide certain matters instead of federal courts.' Like primary jurisdiction and Chevron, abstention involves self-imposed limits on federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction.99 The difference between the principles of abstention, on one hand, and Chevron and primary jurisdiction, on the other, is the target of deference. Chevron and primary jurisdiction allow shifts of federal judicial authority to federal administrative agencies. Other abstention doctrines shift power from federal courts to state institutions, and do so in a way that closely resembles primary jurisdiction.
Primary jurisdiction in individual cases.
Litigants have an immediate interest in whether a court decides to grant primary jurisdiction to an agency. First, one of the parties in the action may be the agency to which the court will defer. For exam-
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See Kaiser Steel, 391 US at 594 ("Sound judicial administration requires that the parties in this case be given the benefit of the same rule of law which will apply to all other businesses and landowners.") (emphasis added). 94 
pie, in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v Bureau of Land Manage-
ment,° several counties were in litigation over work the counties had performed on primitive roads that were managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)." 1 The overarching issue was whether the counties could properly claim the roads as rights of way under a federal statute. '°2 The relevant statute stated that certain rights of way that existed prior to October 1976 "would continue in effect."°3 Determining which rights of way qualify under this statute was difficult because no administrative formalities were instituted to keep track of such matters prior to enactment." ' A dispute arose between the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance and a number of counties over road construction performed by the counties. '°5 The BLM refused to take action as requested by the Alliance, and the Alliance brought suit in federal court to determine if the road construction was properly taking place on rights of way saved by the statute." The district court, relying on circuit precedent that allowed the BLM to perform an initial round of adjudication over rights of way issues under the statute, stayed proceedings and referred the issue to the BLM.'°7 From the counties' perspective, the district court vested their opposing party with primary jurisdiction over the dispute.
Second, courts review agency determinations deferentially. When a district court grants primary jurisdiction and the agency subsequently issues a ruling, the party prevailing in the administrative ruling will often file a motion to have the administrative ruling enforced by the district court. ' 104 See id (noting that the statute required "no entry, no application, no license, no patent, and no deed on the federal side" and "no formal act of public acceptance on the part of the states or localities in whom the right was vested"). 109 See id at 743-44 (discussing the district court's review of the BLM's rulings under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of 5 USC § 706(2)(A)). See also 5 USC § 706 (2000). In some instances, a district court will stay proceedings merely to allow the agency to take a position on the issue. Such a stay is not an exercise of primary jurisdiction, and the district court may review the agencies finding de novo. Southern Utah, 425 F3d at 743-44.
In some instances, the statute that vests the agency with the authority will determine the standard of review."O Regardless of the standard, the varying degrees of deference that district courts apply can exacerbate the concern of litigants because, depending on the enabling statute, an agency may not allow one or both of the parties to participate in its proceedings."' Additionally, adjudication before an agency prior to trial court proceedings increases litigation costs. " 2
II. CONFUSION AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Currently, circuit courts "are split over the standard of review of decisions whether to recognize the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.'. 3 Some circuits have adopted a de novo standard, while others review for an abuse of discretion. Neither approach is correct. Each results in a mismatch between the chosen standard and one of the elements of a primary jurisdiction decision. This mismatch occurs because the two steps present different kinds of questions-one legal and one discretionary. This Part will briefly examine the alignment of the circuit split. Then it will explore the mechanics of the standard-ofreview mismatch and explain the development of the current split.
A. The Circuit Split 1. The abuse of discretion camp.
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits review primary jurisdiction decisions for abuse of discretion."' However, they have not fully explained why they do so. The Third Circuit, in In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation,"' suggested that it reviewed for abuse of discretion because a primary jurisdiction ruling made by a lower court is a prudential decision and "despite what the term may imply, does not speak to the jurisdictional power of the federal When courts review primary jurisdiction determinations de novo, they review the trial court's statutory interpretation and discretionary decision under the same standard. De novo review is the standard normally applied to lower court decisions of statutory interpretation." Discretionary matters, however, are normally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.' 31 As one commentator noted, applying de novo review to both elements of a primary jurisdiction decision "could mean that appellate courts are, in fact, reaching what they think is the proper conclusion regardless of the decision of the lower court."' 32 A similar mismatch occurs when a circuit court reviews for an abuse of discretion. The appellate court reviews the discretionary element of the lower court's decision under the typical standard, abuse of discretion, while reviewing the statutory interpretation element more deferentially than is appropriate.
It has been argued that the standard of review may be "ultimately unimportant."' 3 . But the mismatch has several important consequences. As an institutional matter, when a court reviews a discretionary decision de novo it divests that discretion. This divestiture is problematic because an appellate court is in a worse position to decide if the issues presented go beyond the competency of a trial court. Moreover, primary jurisdiction is fundamentally concerned with balancing federal judicial and administrative decisionmaking.' 3 0 The distinct legal and discretionary inquiries that make up primary jurisdiction are necessary components of striking the appropriate balance. The same is 128 137 F3d 605 (8th Cir 1998). 129 Id at 608 ("Without deciding the standard-of-review question, which is best left to be resolved in case where it is contested, we accept the parties' invitation to review the primary jurisdiction issue de novo."). (2002) . But see id at 923-24 (suggesting that the indecision may be superficial because the Texas courts that review primary jurisdiction determinations for abuse of discretion are actually applying de novo review, indicating "that the standard of review is ultimately unimportant"). 133 Id at 924. 134 See Part I.B.
true of abstention, where courts generally avoid the standard-ofreview mismatch that exists in the primary jurisdiction context. M When trial courts' statutory interpretations are reviewed deferentially, courts of appeals jettison their power to settle questions of law. The mismatch also breeds uncertainty because (as discussed below) circuit courts show a wide range of fidelity to their chosen standard. As a result, there may be derivative harms, such as wasting judicial resources as uncertainty increases parties' litigiousness.
In Southern Utah, the Tenth Circuit hinted at the possibility that the mismatch is mere semantics. The court was asked to review a district court's grant of primary jurisdiction. The parties disputed whether the agency had statutory authority to review the matter." The Tenth Circuit was bound by an earlier decision in Marshall v El Paso Natural Gas Co.. to review primary jurisdiction decisions for an abuse of discretion. 38 To resolve the question of whether the BLM had authority, the Tenth Circuit had to review the district court's interpretation of the statute-a legal question. But recognizing the dilemma created by Marshall (to break with precedent or review the district court's interpretation deferentially) the court decided to "adhere to this circuit's standard of review, while noting that any error of law is presumptively an abuse of discretion and questions of law are reviewed de novo..'.' Essentially, the court imported de novo review under the guise of abuse of discretion.
The Tenth Circuit's approach in Southern Utah illustrates one version of the standard-of-review mismatch that currently pervades primary jurisdiction review. The court implicitly recognized that sometimes de novo review is proper and other times abuse of discretion review is appropriate. If courts can apply the proper standard and follow precedent, however, then what standard courts claim they are applying is not of much of a concern.
The circuit split, unfortunately, is not illusory. First, the Tenth Circuit's strategy can only work in one direction. A court could not import review for abuse of discretion into de novo review. A court would have to consider, analyze, and apply its own discretion. Doing so obviates the more deferential posture of abuse of discretion review. More-over, a strategy like the one in Southern Utah is disingenuous. If pervasive, it would risk the transparency of prior decisions.
Second, and more importantly, the Tenth Circuit's approach in Southern Utah lacks analytical precision. Empirically, courts have failed to approach primary jurisdiction with nuance. They often mismatch the standard of review with one of the doctrine's elements. The D.C. Circuit, in National Telephone Cooperative Association v Exxon Mobil Corp, ' ' applied the abuse of discretion standard and determined that "Exxon failed to show that the [Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs] oversees a comprehensive regulatory scheme that in any way would be disturbed by the instant action.. 14 ' The D.C. Circuit's review was cursory at best. Its only major statement on the issue was the following: "The district court was well within its discretion... 2 Whether the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs oversees a regulatory scheme implicated by the lawsuit in National Telephone Cooperative Association is a question of statutory interpretation. Questions of statutory interpretation-the first component of primary jurisdiction-are more appropriately reviewed de novo because matters of law require uniformity regardless of the specific courtroom resolving a dispute.
In the de novo camp, the Second Circuit applied true de novo review to the discretionary element of a primary jurisdiction decision. In National Communications Association, the court reversed the district court's grant of primary jurisdiction. A key issue was whether "the validity of a billing practice" for tariffs charged between telecommunications providers was a matter requiring the expertise of the FCC. This issue was a discretionary matter. The district court determined that the FCC's expertise was critical and granted primary jurisdiction. 1 " The Second Circuit disagreed.' 4 ' Under the Second Circuit's view, the issue "could easily be resolved by a district court in a reasonable amount of time.""' But under review for abuse of discretion, mere disagreement should not be enough. The court gave no weight to the district court's findings and substituted its own judgment.
The Eighth Circuit also reviewed a district court's discretionary determination de novo. In Access Telecommunications, both elements of the district court's primary jurisdiction determination were at issue. The Eighth Circuit held that the FCC had statutory authority over the dispute because "[t]he issue is whether the 6,000-foot limitation is a reasonable classification... 7 More importantly, reviewing de novo, the circuit court agreed that resolving the dispute would require the decisionmaker "to become embroiled in the technical aspects of VG 7 service." 1 ' In this case, the district court's decision held up under the least deferential standard, indicating the outcome would not have been different if the circuit court had reviewed for an abuse of discretion. That de novo review, however, was applied to both aspects of the district court's decision indicates that the standard-of-review mismatch is real. Moreover, the court noted that both parties relied on a de novo standard in their briefs. The court may have been troubled by the mismatch resulting from courts' current approach. ' More recently, and since Southern Utah, the mismatch has continued. In Ellis v Tribune Television Co,'O the Second Circuit addressed whether a district court improperly denied the FCC primary jurisdiction regarding Tribune Television's possible violations of FCC cross-ownership rules."' The parties conceded that the FCC had authority to address Tribune Television's possible violations." 2 The dispute centered entirely on whether the district court properly applied its discretion in denying primary jurisdiction. " ' The circuit court reviewed de novo., The district court's denial was overruled because the circuit court determined there would be a high risk of inconsistent rulings if the FCC was not allowed to address the dispute first. "5 In deciding the case, the court expressly considered factors that should be left to the discretion of district courts-"whether the question at issue [wa]s within the conventional experience of judges," whether it created "a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings," and "whether a prior application to the [FCC] ha[d] been made." ' ' When the question of primary jurisdiction arises, it is often difficult to determine how faithful a court's opinion is to its announced standard, particularly when the announced standard is abuse of discre- ' The opinion does not discuss any of the conclusions of the district court.' 59 It is impossible to know whether the Fifth Circuit's disposition was as deferential as it purported to be. The court could have been improperly imposing its own discretion. This lack of transparency increases the risk that outcomes grounded on erroneous points of law will never be ameliorated.
C. Evolution of the Circuit Split
One commentator has described the confusion over the appropriate standard as a disagreement about whether primary jurisdiction is jurisdictional or prudential. 0 This explanation is insufficient. The Supreme Court has noted that the doctrine, despite its name, is not purely jurisdictional."' Moreover, even courts that disagree on the standard recognize the essentially prudential character of the doctrine."' The evolution of the circuit split is complex. There is a unique story for the prevailing standard in each circuit. Although courts have rarely explained their reasons for adopting a particular standard, two themes can be discerned from the case law. ' When the interpretive element is easy and the discretionary element is the center of dispute, a court reviewing as a matter of first impression is more likely to review for abuse of discretion. When the discretionary determination is easy and the statutory interpretation is disputed, a court of appeals reviewing as a matter of first impression is more likely to review de novo. In General Electric, de novo review was a sensible standard because the dispute centered on the statutory interpretation element of primary jurisdiction. 7 The dispositive issue was whether the type of challenge to the shipping rates was one the FMC had authority to address.' 65 Although the court did not declare a standard, it became the seed for de novo review in the Second Circuit. In National Communications Association, the circuit relied on General Electric in expressly declaring the standard for the first time.169
The Tenth Circuit first declared its abuse of discretion standard in Marshall.' 70 The standard was sensible in that case because only the discretionary component of primary jurisdiction was at issue. The dispute hinged on whether some of the factual issues within the purview of the relevant agency were "not within the conventional knowledge of judges or jurors, and will result in inconsistent orders of the district court and the [agency] .'' Since Marshall, the Tenth Circuit has con- . 165 See id at 1025-28 (addressing Nedlloyd's argument that under primary jurisdiction, the FMC should have reviewed GE's attack on the reasonableness of Nedlloyd's shipping rate first). 166 See id at 1025 (labeling Part I of the opinion "The Jurisdictional Issue"). 167 See id at 1026-27. 168 See id (weighing the factors for primary jurisdiction and concluding that "[blecause those factors that bring the doctrine of primary jurisdiction into play are absent, there is no reason to adopt Nedlloyd's suggestion that the issue of the reasonableness of GE's ad valorem charge be referred to the FMC"). 169 See 46 F3d at 222 (stating "the standard of review is essentially de novo" and citing General Electric for the procedure for review The inference that the predominating issue in a few cases has arbitrarily influenced which standard takes hold is somewhat anecdotal. The pattern, however, persists in the majority of circuits.'" Moreover, the explanation is more compelling when considered in conjunction with the cases a court turns to for guidance. When primary jurisdiction arises as an issue of first impression, circuits are influenced by two types of cases-cases involving doctrines similar to primary jurisdiction and primary jurisdiction cases from other circuits.
First, when declaring the standard of review for the first time, circuit courts have commonly looked to cases that involve doctrines similar to primary jurisdiction. In Marshall, the Tenth Circuit looked to Burford v Sun Oil Co' and Grimes v Crown Life Insurance Co,'" which applied the abuse of discretion standard to Burford abstention. ° As discussed in Part I, the key distinction between primary jurisdiction and Burford abstention is that primary jurisdiction defers to federal administrative agencies rather than state bodies. The court was insightful in looking to Burford. Interestingly, in Marshall and Grimes, it was a foregone conclusion that the requisite conditions for abstention existed."' Grimes, therefore, only considered whether the district 174 Courts have consequently developed case law that fortifies improperly holistic standards for reviewing primary jurisdiction. Instead of recognizing the two distinct components of primary jurisdiction and using that distinction to distinguish prior cases, circuits adhere to these ill-considered precedents. Confusion and disagreement have developed as courts continue to review various permutations of the primary jurisdiction question.
III. THE PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DETERMINATIONS
Courts of appeals should review primary jurisdiction determinations in a two-tiered manner. This approach has been applied in several substantive areas of law where district courts make determinations that include distinct legal and discretionary components. Significantly, a two-step review is applied to other discretionary abstention doctrines. This Part outlines the proper two-step review for primary jurisdiction and compares that approach to appellate review of other doctrines of abstention.
A. A New Approach: The Primary Jurisdiction Two-Step Because a primary jurisdiction decision involves interpretative and discretionary elements, it has been suggested "it would make little sense to do part of the analysis under de novo review and another part under abuse of discretion review."'. That suggestion is wrong. Circuit courts can, and do, distinguish between legal elements and discretionary elements composing part of a larger doctrinal decision tree. Circuit courts ought to break a primary jurisdiction decision into its two elements: statutory interpretation and judicial discretion. Then they ought to review those distinct elements separately under different standards. Under this two-step review, a district court's statutory interpretation-a matter of law-is reviewed de novo. A district court's decision as to whether the purposes behind primary jurisdiction are furthered by deferring to the agency-a matter of discretion-is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
If an agency does not oversee a regulatory scheme implicated by the dispute, then that is the end of the matter because primary jurisdiction is never appropriate in such a situation. For example, in National Telephone Cooperative Association, the court should have reviewed de novo whether "the [Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs] oversees a comprehensive regulatory scheme that in any way would be disturbed by the instant action.". Instead, the circuit court applied a cursory review of the lower court's statutory interpretation. ' 94 On the other hand, if the reviewing court determines that an agency does have the authority to address the issues implicated by the litigation, then the circuit court should review the lower court's exercise of discretion in granting or rejecting primary jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. For example, in National Communications Association, the Second Circuit should have reviewed the district court's decision to refer certain issues to the FCC deferentially." ' Instead, the court reversed the district court's grant based on a de novo standard of review. Finally, when reviewing the discretionary element of primary jurisdiction, circuit courts should continue to look for guidance to the factors considered in Western Pacific Railroad. M It is important that step two is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Step two requires a district court to consider factors such as the potential consequences of further delay, the importance of technical issues to an ultimate resolution, and whether the question over which the court and agency share jurisdiction is one beyond the competence of a judge.' 9 8 These considerations embroil a district judge in the facts in a way that appellate judges cannot replicate. Allowing a circuit court to substitute its discretion on such matters is inconsonant with primary 193 244 F3d at 156. 194 See id. 195 See 46 F3d at 222.
196 See id at 222-25 (explaining its reasons for reversing the distraction court without indicating any deference to the district court's determination). 197 See 352 US at 64 (discussing "the desirable uniformity which would obtain if initially a specialized agency passed on certain types of administrative questions" and "the expert and specialized knowledge" of an agency assisted in adjudication). The two-step standard of review proposed by this Comment is novel only as applied to primary jurisdiction. Two-step review is applied to many determinations which involve legal and discretionary considerations. For example, courts often apply a two-step review to criminal sentencing. In United States v Myers, ' 9 the court "first examine[d] de novo whether the district court correctly interpreted and applied the [sentencing] guidelines." The court then reviewed sentences outside the guidelines range for abuse of discretion. 2" Courts also review a decision on whether to bar an expert witness in a twotiered fashion. The Seventh Circuit, in Durkin v Equifax Check Services, Inc, 2 M stated that "[w]e first review, de novo, whether the district court properly followed the framework set forth in Daubert.... Having determined that the district court properly applied Daubert, we next review the district court's decision to bar an expert for an abuse of discretion." 3 Most importantly, courts of appeals have already applied twotiered review to other two-step abstention doctrines that involve a predicate legal inquiry followed by a discretionary determination. Pullman abstention-suspending proceedings to allow unsettled state law to eliminate or narrow constitutional issues in federal courtrequires a two-step inquiry. A court must first decide whether uncertain state law underlies a constitutional question facing the court and whether the uncertainty is amenable to resolution in state court such that it mitigates or eliminates the need to resolve the constitutional question. 9 If the conditions allowing for abstention exist, a court must exercise its discretion to decide if suspending federal court proceedings is appropriate in the particular case.
2 05 In line with this Comment's proposal, the Third Circuit applies "two separate standards of review." '9 The first step is reviewed de novo.'°7 If a district court properly
